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1069 
PATENTABILITY OF CHEMICAL AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS: A 
DISCREPANCY IN STANDARDS 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution sets forth provisions that promote the 
progress of science and useful arts.1 Industrious parties heed the call to 
create and to have their inventions patented. Once an invention is patented, 
the inventor alone reaps the benefits of his creation and has the right to 
exclude others from using his invention.2 In return for this period of 
exclusive use, the inventor fully discloses his invention to the public.3  
Today, obtaining patent rights is essential to the viability of corporate 
America,4 and arguably, of the national economy.5 This is especially true 
for the pharmaceutical industry, where companies invest hundreds of 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress has the power “to promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id. 
 2. DONALD CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 3 (2d ed. 2001). “A patent gives an 
inventor the right to exclude. A patent does not give the inventor the positive right to make, use, or sell 
the invention. This is a common misunderstanding of the modern patent grant. . . .” Id. The patent 
owner can exclude others from using his invention without his permission. Id. Thus, if a competitor 
desires to use the patented invention, the competitor must obtain permission or a license from the 
patent holder to do so. Id. 
 3. Id. at ch.2. Several reasons exist for requiring full disclosure, including preventing 
duplication of work and effort, advancing technology by allowing others to see the invention so that 
they may make improvements, and making the inventor clarify the limits of his rights so that others 
know exactly what they can practice without risk of infringement. Id. If the bounds of the inventor’s 
rights are not clear, others may decide not to risk practicing in a related area for fear of infringement. 
Id. This would artificially expand the patent holder’s rights since it would prevent others from 
practicing the patented invention and related inventions. Id. By making the boundaries of the invention 
clear, full disclosure serves society by allowing unhindered development in fields related, but not 
identical, to the patented invention and by allowing improvements to be made on the invention. Id.  
 4. Id. at 58-76. Intellectual property (“IP”), specifically patents, is crucial to the growth of the 
national economy and to business success. Id. Many see IP law as a policy tool for industrial growth. 
Id. Companies invest large sums of money to protect their IP rights, as evidenced by “billion-dollar 
licenses, infringement verdicts, and sales.” Id. at 59.  
 5. Wesley Cohen, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why 
U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not), NBER Working Paper 7552 (Feb. 2000), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/NBER Working Paper No.w7552. The report discloses that between 1983 and 
1995, the total number of U.S. patents issued to U.S. companies increased 72%. Id. at 16. The reasons 
cited for seeking patent protection for product innovations include (in decreasing order of importance): 
prevent copying, blocking (prevent others from obtaining a patent on the invention), prevent suits, 
enhance reputation, use in negotiations, licensing revenue, and measure performance. Id. at 47, fig. 7. 
The reasons cited for seeking patent protection for process innovations included the same reasons as 
product innovations, except that “use in negotiations” was cited as a more important reason than 
“enhance reputation.” Id. at 48, fig. 8.  
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millions of dollars in drug discovery.6 In order to ensure a return on their 
investments in drug discovery and development, pharmaceutical 
companies guard their patent rights for the full duration of the patent’s life 
and often seek extensions on that life.7 The pharmaceutical-company 
patentees dread the expiration of a patent term, which can, and often does, 
adversely affect Wall Street’s valuation of the company.8  
Pharmaceutical companies have patented a large number of therapeutic 
chemical and biological compounds.9 Statutory patentability requirements 
must be satisfied in order for a patent to issue, and these requirements 
apply to all utility patents in every field of invention.10 However, over the 
last century the area of chemical practice has developed, resulting in a set 
of patentability standards and requirements that are unique to chemical 
inventions.11 These standards surpass the level of review prescribed by 
statute and result in higher scrutiny by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) and the courts for these types of inventions.12 
 
 
 6. Steven C. Tighle et al., Comment: U.S. Major Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Cost Effective 
Research Spending, Merril Lynch Report, 4 (Mar. 27, 2002). It is estimated that in 1990, the average 
cost to bring a pharmaceutical product to market was $500 million. Id. Today, the cost is believed to 
be $800 million. Id. “Since a pharmaceutical company’s products all eventually go off patent, 
production of new, innovative drugs and therefore new patents is essential in order for the company to 
continue growing.” Id. at 2. 
 7. See CHISUM supra note 2 at 833. Three reasons exist to seek an extension of a patent’s 
duration: delayed responses from the PTO, greater than three year pendency, and interferences, 
secrecy orders, and appeals. Id. However, of significance to pharmaceutical companies, the Hatch-
Waxman Act allows patent term extensions in certain circumstances caused by regulatory delays in 
drug approval by the Food and Drug Administration. Id. at 1210.  
 8.  See Tighle, supra note 6, at 2. “[T]he number of granted patents indicates the level of 
innovation taking place in the company, and can be considered one potential indicator of the 
company’s success in developing new drugs.” Id. at 2. 
 9. M.E. Mogee & R.G. Kolar, Patent Citation Analysis of New Chemical Entities Claimed as 
Pharmaceuticals, in 8(3) EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS, 213-22 (1998).  
Patent references are of particular interest for technology analysis because they offer a 
measure of patent importance and a method of identifying links among patents. Citation 
analysis was performed on the set of all U.S. patents that cover new chemical entities (NCEs) 
claimed as pharmaceuticals and issued during the years 1993 through late 1997. Merck & Co. 
heads the list, with 577 patents or almost 5% of the total. Hoechst Marion Roussel is second 
with 499 patents or about 4% of the total. Eli Lilly is third with 337 patents or about 3% of all 
patents. 
Id. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2001). For a discussion of these requirements, see ROBERT 
P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE ch. 3 (2d ed. 2000). 
 11. For a detailed analysis of chemical practice, see JEROME ROSENSTOCK, THE LAW OF 
CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL INVENTION, PATENT AND NONPATENT PROTECTION (2d ed. 2002).  
 12. CHISUM, supra note 2, at ch. 2. Before a patent can be granted, patent applications are 
submitted to the PTO for review to determine if the statutory patentability requirements have been 
satisfied. Id. Patent law is governed exclusively by federal law. Id. The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has federal question jurisdiction over matters concerning patents. 
Id. Decisions made by the PTO can be appealed directly to the Federal Circuit. Id. Teachings in patent 
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In contrast to the field of chemical practice, the development of 
therapeutic biological compounds in the pharmaceutical industry, termed 
biotechnology, is fairly young.13 As a result, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) and the United States Supreme Court 
have heard few cases interpreting the patentability requirements for 
biotechnology inventions.14  
Within the area of biotechnology, a number of patents pertain to 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”)15 and protein sequences.16 Scholars and 
scientists who fear ethical repercussions resulting from the patenting of 
genetic material that exists in living beings assail these patents and find 
then to be controversial.17  
Technically, DNA and protein sequences18 are complex chemical 
molecules.19 Thus, for patentability, these sequences should fall within the 
higher scrutiny standards that apply to chemical compound inventions.20 
However, an examination of issued patents suggests that the PTO is not 
holding patents on DNA and protein sequences to the same rigorous 
standards as chemical compound claims.21 The Federal Circuit rulings also 
display an inconsistency with chemical practice.22 One concern that arises 
 
 
law come from the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court. Id. For a discussion on the 
history leading to the formation of the Federal Circuit, see KENNETH BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 5-16 (1995). 
 13. The seminal case that gave birth to the field of biotechnology patent law was Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress 
meant for “anything under the sun” to be patented as long as it was useful. Id. at 309. Specifically, the 
case held that a man-made strain of bacteria was patentable subject matter. Id. at 310. 
 14. CHISUM, supra note 2, at 279 n.3.  
 15. A basic review of molecular biology and biotechnology can be found in In re O’Farrell, 853 
F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL ch. 2 and 
3 (3d ed. 1994).  
 16. ALBERTS, supra note 15, ch. 3. 
 17. Daniel Kevles & Ari Berkowitz, The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of Law, 
Economic Interests, and Ethics, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 233, 248 (Fall 2001). “Given that the human 
genome is widely regarded as a common birthright of people everywhere, governments may feel 
increasing pressure to limit the property rights sought in DNA sequences.” Id. For a discussion of the 
ethical arguments for and against the patenting of human genes and one answer to the question of “Do 
DNA patents threaten human dignity?,” see David Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 152 (Summer 2001). 
 18. DNA and proteins are complex chemical compounds, but chemical compounds nonetheless, 
see generally ALBERTS, supra note 15, ch. 2 and 3. DNA is a double-stranded chain of chemical 
subunits called nucleotides. Id. Proteins are composed of chains of chemical subunits called amino 
acids. Id. Amino acids are organic compounds containing both an amino group and a carboxylic acid. 
Id.  
 19. Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “A 
gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one . . . .” Id. at 1206.  
 20. See supra note 11. 
 21. See infra notes 33-58, 68-77. 
 22. See infra notes 113-21, 131-46. 
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is that while the PTO is issuing patents for DNA and protein sequence 
claims, it is not clear whether these patents will survive judicial scrutiny.23 
If the patents are not invalidated, a discrepancy will result between 
chemical practice and biotechnology practice at the PTO and in the 
courts.24 If the patents are invalidated, a discrepancy will exist between 
PTO practice and the standards followed by the court.25 Neither result is 
desirable.  
The Overview section of this Note will present the standards of review 
that exist for chemical patents and biotechnology patents, and will 
highlight perceived differences between the two standards. The Analysis 
section will discuss the implications of these disparities, the questions that 
the Federal Circuit has yet to address, and the unresolved concerns in the 
present patent system.  
Finally, this Note proposes that biotechnology practice, a subset of 
chemical practice, should be held to the same standards as chemical 
practice. Otherwise, the United States patent system will suffer, becoming 
the subject of increased litigation. The discrepancies in patentability 
between biotechnology and chemical inventions need to be corrected and 
avoided to lend credibility and predictability to this subset of chemical 
practice. Failure to correct these problems will negatively impact 
pharmaceutical research and development as well as technological 
advancement. 
I. OVERVIEW 
Among the statutory requirements that must be satisfied in order for a 
patent to issue, four provisions are key: utility,26 novelty,27 
nonobviousness,28 and written description.29 These provisions are the 
subject of dispute in both the PTO and the courts.  
 
 
 23. See infra notes 33-58, 66-77. 
 24. Compare notes 113-21 with 131-46. 
 25. Compare notes 33-58 with 66-77. 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 102. The statutory requirement of novelty will not be discussed in this Note.  
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).  
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II. UTILITY30 
A. Chemical Practice31 
Although the requirements for patentability are applicable to all areas 
of utility patents, the field of chemical practice has developed distinct 
standards.32 In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of chemical invention utility and was required to determine whether or not 
the patent applicant had demonstrated that his invention was useful.33 The 
Court stated that, in contrast to utility patents in other fields of technology, 
“it is not remarkable that differences arise as to how the test of usefulness 
is to be applied to chemical processes.”34 Thus, distinct utility 
requirements developed for chemical practice.35 
Prior to the Brenner case, the trend in chemical patent jurisprudence 
was that the PTO rejected patent applications unless the specification 
clearly established the utility of the claimed invention.36 In contrast, the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”)37 took the position that 
 
 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads: Inventions patentable: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
 31. This Note focuses on chemical practice in the sense of chemical compounds that are used for 
pharmaceutical purposes only. Different requirements have been established as to the patentability 
requirements for pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical chemical compounds. ROSENSTOCK, supra 
note 11, at 2-20.3 to 2-21. The focus of this Note is the comparison of chemical claims to DNA and 
protein sequence claims in the context of pharmaceuticals.  
 32. See supra note 11. 
 33. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). In this case, applicant had filed for a patent for a 
steroidal compound. Id. at 520. The examiner rejected the application because it failed to disclose 
utility. Id. at 521. The examiner did not accept applicant’s argument that the compound in question had 
utility based on the fact that it was similar to a compound that was being tested for anti-tumor effects. 
Id. at 521-22. The Patent Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection, stating, “it is our view that the 
statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be 
closely related to another compound which is known to be useful.” Id. at 522.  
 34. Id. at 530. 
 35. Id. at 534. 
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of inhibiting secrecy, 
we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, 
which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a 
monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. 
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the 
metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. 
Id. 
 36. Id. at 529-30. 
 37. CHISUM, supra note 2, at 25 n.94. The CCPA was the predecessor of the Federal Circuit that 
exists today. Id. The Federal Circuit has subject-matter jurisdiction over matters pertaining to patents. 
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2001). 
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the utility requirement is satisfied if it is “sufficient that a process 
produces the result intended and is not ‘detrimental to the public 
interest.’”38 According to the approach taken by the CCPA, almost every 
patent application would satisfy the utility requirement.39  
In Brenner, the Supreme Court held that to satisfy the utility 
requirement, the inventor must have in his possession knowledge of the 
boundaries of the utility of the invention.40 According to the Court, the 
reason for requiring this level of definitiveness in the utility of the 
invention is that otherwise, patentees would be granted the right to exclude 
others from using the claimed invention even in areas that are not of 
legitimate use or exclusive to the patentee.41  
In the patent process, an inventor receives the right to exclude others 
from practicing the patented invention.42 In return for this right, the 
patentee must fully disclose his invention so that the public can benefit 
from it.43 If the patentee does not specify the precise utility of his 
invention and is nonetheless granted a patent, the patent would preclude 
others from developing applications and uses for the invention in other 
fields.44 This result ultimately is detrimental to society because science and 
the arts would not be developed to their fullest extents.45 The Supreme 
Court sought to prevent this potential chilling effect on the advancement 
of the inventive process.46 In addition, the Court set forth the standard that 
chemical compounds must satisfy for the utility requirement and the 
rationale underlying this requirement.47  
 
 
 38. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 529-30.  
 39. Id. at 530. The CCPA would find the utility requirement satisfied for any process that 
produces an intended result and “is not ‘detrimental to the public interst.’” Id. 
 40. Id. at 534.  
 41. Id. at 534. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 533-34. 
 47. Id. at 534-35. “Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where 
specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification for permitting an 
applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.” Id. Today, the utility requirement is not often 
the focus of review at the PTO or in the courts. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As 
exemplified in In re Brana, the court typically analyzes the utility of the invention of a patent 
application as part of a 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 analysis:  
The requirement that an invention have utility is found in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “Whoever invents 
. . . any new and useful . . . composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . .” 
(emphasis added). It is also implicit in § 112 ¶ 1, which reads: The specification shall contain 
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which 
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/5
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In the case In re Kirk, the CCPA further described how to satisfy the 
utility requirement.48 First, the court made it clear that the assertion of 
utility in a patent application required more than a broad statement that the 
invention is useful.49 Also, reemphasizing the holding in Brenner,50 the 
court held that a specific attribute or utility of the invention must be 
shown, and that it is not up to the court or public to attempt to ascertain 
that usefulness.51 Next, the court held that the utility requirement cannot be 
satisfied if the invention is useful as an intermediate for making a final 
product with an unknown utility.52 Finally, the court clearly stated that a 
chemical compound cannot acquire utility based solely on its structural 
 
 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.  
Id. Also, because § 112 addresses whether or not an invention has been enabled, utility is inherent in 
the analysis of enablement since an applicant cannot teach how to use something that is useless. In re 
Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1971). As stated in In re Fouche, “if such compositions are in 
fact useless, appellant’s specification cannot have taught how to use them.” Id. However, this is not to 
say that utility is never at issue in a case. For example, see Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 
1985).  
 48. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 49. Id. at 941 (“It seems to us that the nebulous expressions ‘biological activity’ or ‘biological 
properties’ appearing in the specification convey no more explicit indication of the usefulness of the 
compounds and how to use them than did the equally obscure expression ‘useful for “technical and 
pharmaceutical purposes . . . .”’”).  
 50. See supra notes 35, 40. 
 51. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 942.  
We do not believe that it was the intention of the statutes to require the Patent Office, the 
courts, or the public to play the sort of guessing game that might be involved if an applicant 
could satisfy the requirements of the statutes by indicating the usefulness of a claimed 
compound in terms of possible use so general as to be meaningless and then, after his 
research or that of his competitors has definitely ascertained an actual use for the compound, 
adducing evidence intended to show that a particular specific use would have been obvious to 
men skilled in the particular art to which this use relates.  
Id. (quoting In re Diedrich, 318 F.2d 946, 949 (1963)). 
 52. Id. at 945.  
We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although Congress intended that no 
patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole “utility” consists of its potential role as 
an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply to the process which 
yielded the unpatentable product. That proposition seems to us little more than an attempt to 
evade the impact of the rules which concededly govern patentability of the product itself.  
(quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966)) (emphasis omitted). 
[T]he practical utility of the compound, or compounds, produced from a chemical 
“intermediate”, the “starting material” in such a process, is an essential element in 
establishing patentability of that intermediate. It seems clear that, if a process for producing a 
product of only conjectural use is not itself “useful” within 101, it cannot be said that the 
starting materials for such a process—i.e., the presently claimed intermediates- are “useful.” 
It is not enough that the specification disclose that the intermediate exists and that it “works,” 
reacts, or can be used to produce some intended product of no known use. 
Id. 
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similarity to a compound or class of compounds that has a known utility.53 
Often, a chemical that structurally resembles a compound of known utility 
fails to share the same function as the known compound.54 Thus, a patent 
application must specifically describe the utility of the chemical 
invention.55 Utility cannot be inferred from vague statements of “utility”,56 
the compound’s use as an intermediate to produce a final product with 
unknown function,57 or from structural similarity to a compound of 
unknown function.58  
B. Biotechnology Practice 
In contrast to chemical practice, the field of biotechnology is a more 
recent development.59 The United States Supreme Court essentially 
created the field in 1980 with Diamond v. Chakrabarty.60 The Court 
concluded that Congress’ intent when it recodifed the Patent Act in 1952 
was for “statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.’”61 The Court made clear that non-naturally occurring 
discoveries and inventions are patentable, while previously unknown but 
natural compositions of matter that are discovered are not patentable.62  
Following the reasoning set forth by the Court, a DNA sequence or 
gene taken out of its natural context in a living cell could be patentable 
subject matter because it is not in its naturally occurring state,63 provided 
 
 
 53. Id. at 942. “It cannot be presumed that a steroid chemical compound is ‘useful’ under 101, or 
that one of skill in the art will know ‘how to use’ it, simply because the compound is closely related 
only in a structural sense to other steroid compounds known to be useful.” Id. 
 54. Id. (“Appellants’ arguments fail to recognize that many steroid compounds may possess no 
activity whatsoever.”). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 941-42. 
 57. Id. at 945. 
 58. Id. at 945-46. 
 59. See supra note 13. 
 60. 447 U.S. 303. 
 61. Id. at 309 (citing S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1954)). The Court also reiterated that “[t]he laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.” Id. 
 62. Id. at 309-10  
[R]espondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not 
to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter- a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character 
and use’ . . . [T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. 
His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under § 101.”). 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 63. Id. The DNA is in a state made by man, outside of its natural context. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/5
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that the other statutory patentability requirements are satisfied.64 However, 
this simple application of the Chakraberty ruling65 to DNA sequences and 
genes is only the beginning of the analysis: Although DNA exists in 
biological organisms, it is technically a chemical compound66 and thus, 
should be subject to the patentability requirements that exist for chemical 
practice.67  
In 2001, the PTO set forth new examination procedure guidelines for 
patent applications for inventions involving DNA sequences and isolated 
genes.68 The guidelines state that the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 is satisfied when a specific, substantial, and credible utility is 
disclosed.69  
In certain respects, the guidelines appear to concede that DNA is a 
chemical compound and should be evaluated as such.70 However, the 
guidelines contradict chemical practice in several ways. First, the 
guidelines state: 
[W]hen a patent application claiming a nucleic acid asserts a 
specific, substantial, and credible utility, and bases the assertion 
upon homology to existing nucleic acids or proteins having an 
accepted established utility, the asserted utility must be accepted by 
 
 
 64. See MERGES, supra note 10.  
 65. See supra note 13. 
 66. See supra notes 18-19. 
 67. See supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text.  
 68. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 69. Id. at 1094. The guidelines also make clear that, “[i]f a patent application discloses only 
nucleic acid molecular structure for a newly discovered gene . . . the claimed invention is not 
patentable. But when the inventor also discloses how to use the purified gene isolated from its natural 
state, the application satisfies the ‘utility’ requirement.” Id. at 1093. Nucleic acid is the chemical 
building blocks of which DNA is composed. See generally ALBERTS, supra note 15, ch. 2.  
 70. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1094. 
When patents for genes are treated the same as for other chemicals, progress is promoted 
because the original inventor has the possibility to recoup research costs, because others are 
motivated to invent around the original patent, and because a new chemical is made available 
as a basis for future research. Other inventors who develop new and nonobvious methods of 
using the patented compound have the opportunity to patent those methods. 
Id.  
A DNA sequence—i.e., the sequence of the base pairs making up a DNA molecule- is simply 
one of the properties of a DNA molecule. Like any descriptive property, a DNA sequence 
itself is not patentable . . . [A]n isolated and purified DNA molecule may meet the statutory 
utility requirement if, e.g., it can be used to produce a useful protein or it hybridizes near and 
serves as a marker for a disease gene. Therefore, a DNA molecule is not per se unpatentable 
for lack of utilit[y].” 
Id. “A DNA sequence is not patentable because a sequence is merely descriptive information about a 
molecule.” Id. at 1095. 
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the examiner unless the Office has sufficient evidence or sound 
scientific reasoning to rebut such an assertion.71 (emphasis added). 
This statement directly contradicts chemical practice, which holds that 
because even structurally-similar chemical compounds can have 
unpredictably-different properties, no utility can be claimed on the basis of 
similarity to a compound of known function.72 Indeed, there are numerous 
examples of DNA sequences that display a high degree of homology and 
even identity in certain regions or domains of the gene; however, the 
highly similar proteins encoded by these DNA sequences in fact exert 
opposite or varied effects on the cells in which they are present.73  
Next, the guidelines contradictorily state, “[w]hen a class of proteins is 
defined such that the members share a specific, substantial, and credible 
utility, the reasonable assignment of a new protein to the class of 
sufficiently conserved proteins would impute the same specific, 
substantial, and credible utility to the assigned protein.”74 As already 
stated, numerous examples exist of proteins and their encoding DNA 
sequences that share a high degree of homology yet serve different 
functions.75 Allowing a patent to issue on a DNA or protein sequence 
where the only utility is based upon homology to known sequences runs 
the hazard of ascribing a function to a protein that is in fact opposite to its 
true function.76 Also, it runs the hazard of contradicting the rules and 
precedent that have been established for chemical practice.77  
 
 
 71. Id. at 1096. Loosely, homology means similarity. 
 72. See supra notes 33, 53. 
 73. B. Matiba et al., The CD95 System and the Death of a Lymphocyte, 9(1) SEMINARS IN 
IMMUNOLOGY 59-68 (Feb. 1997). For example, a naturally-occurring mutation (change) in the CD95 
protein’s DNA sequence causes the protein to have a completely opposite effect on the cell from the 
effect the normal CD95 has. Id. As another example, the proteins involved in controlling programmed 
cell death include a number of proteins that are nearly identical for most of the proteins’ regions yet 
vary in other regions, resulting in proteins that exert opposite effects on the cell. Q.L. Deveraux & J.C. 
Reed, IAP Family Proteins- Suppressors of Apoptosis, 13 GENES AND DEVELOPMENT 239-52 (1999). 
 74. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1096.  
 75. See supra note 73. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra notes 33-58 and accompanying text. The guidelines contradict established 
chemical practice. Id. 
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III. NONOBVIOUSNESS78 
A. Chemical Practice 
A frequent issue of patent litigation is whether or not the invention 
disclosed in a patent application is “obvious”79: If the claimed invention 
would have been evident to someone with ordinary skill in the art or if the 
 
 
 78. 35 U.S.C. § 103 reads: Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter: 
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in 
which the invention was made. 
 (b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), and upon timely election by the applicant for 
patent to proceed under this subsection, a biotechnological process using or resulting in a 
composition of matter that is novel under section 102 and nonobvious under subsection (a) of 
this section shall be considered nonobvious if— 
 (A) claims to the process and the composition of matter are contained in either the same 
application for patent or in separate applications having the same effective filing date; and 
 (B) the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented, were owned 
by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. 
 (2) A patent issued on a process under paragraph (1)— 
 (A) shall also contain the claims to the composition of matter used in or made by that 
process, or 
 (B) shall, if such composition of matter is claimed in another patent, be set to expire on 
the same date as such other patent, notwithstanding section 154. 
 (3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "biotechnological process" means— 
 (A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi- celled 
organism to— 
 (i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, 
 (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide 
sequence, or 
 (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said 
organism; 
 (B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a 
monoclonal antibody; and 
 (C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or 
(B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
 (c) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under 
one or more of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude 
patentability under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at 
the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of 
assignment to the same person.  
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001). 
 79. See CHISUM, supra note 2, ch. 5. Obviousness is frequently the largest hurdle to overcome in 
attaining a patent. Id. In addition, when a patent is asserted against an alleged infringer in court, the 
infringer invariably challenges the validity of the patent, often as being obvious. Id.  
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state of the field at the time of invention were such as to motivate one to 
attempt the invention, the nonobvious requirement has not been satisfied.80  
The key consideration taken into account in chemical practice is the 
amount of structural similarity between the claimed and prior art 
compounds.81 As set forth in In re Dillon, a showing of such similarity, in 
combination with motivation from the art to make the compound, gives 
rise to a prima facie case of obviousness that the applicant must rebut.82 
Several cases have suggested that structural similarity alone may give rise 
to a prima facie case, such as when the state of knowledge in the field 
provides motivation for making the modification of the prior art to create 
the invention.83 However, this result can only be consistent with Dillon if 
 
 
 80. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). All obviousness analyses begin with an 
evaluation of three factors that were set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co.:  
[T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art 
and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art 
resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is 
determined.  
Id. In addition to these three factors, the court also reviews secondary considerations. Graham, 383 
U.S. at 17-18 and ROSENSTOCK, supra note 11, at 8-7 to 8-8. The secondary considerations, not 
limited to chemical practice, that may overcome a prima facie case of obviousness include: long felt 
need for the invention, commercial success of the invention, initial expressions of disbelief by experts, 
copying by an infringer, near simultaneous invention by others, initial skepticism by experts, initial 
praise by experts, prior failure by others. Id.  
 81. In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “The question of ‘structural similarity’ in 
chemical patent cases has generated a body of patent law unto itself.” Id. (citation ommitted). 
 82. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
[S]tructural similarity between claimed and prior art subject matter, proved by combining 
references or otherwise, where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed 
compositions, creates a prima facie case of obviousness, and that the burden (and 
opportunity) then falls on an applicant to rebut that prima facie case. 
Id. In In re Papesch, the court stated a reminder that the structure of the compound is only one 
characteristic of the compound and although this characteristic must be taken into account, it is not the 
exclusive consideration in the matter of obviousness. 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).  
[A] formula is not a compound and while it may serve in a claim to identify what is being 
patented, as the metes and bounds of a deed identify a plot of land, the thing that is patented is 
not the formula but the compound identified by it. And the patentability of the thing does not 
depend on the similarity of its formula to that of another compound but of the similarity if the 
former compound to the latter. 
Id.  
 83. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing the theory of 
bioisosterism, “where the substitution of one atom or group of atoms for another atom or group of 
atoms having a similar size, shape and electron density provides molecules having the same biological 
activity.”). The court in Merck also quoted the Payne decision, stating, “structural similarity, alone, 
may be sufficient to give rise to an expectation that compounds similar in structure will have similar 
properties.” Id. at 1096 (citing In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 313 (C.C.P.A. 1979). This holding is 
consistent with Merck since bioisosterism was also a consideration in Payne. 
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the state of knowledge in the field does in fact provide the motivation of 
likelihood of success that, in addition to the structural similarity, satisfies 
the Dillon requirements for prima facie obviousness.84  
The prima facie case of obviousness can be overcome in several ways, 
including demonstration of unobvious85 or unexpected properties.86 For 
example, in In re Lambooy, the Board of Appeals of the PTO held the 
applicant’s invention to be obvious in light of the prior art since, inter alia, 
the chemical structure of the applicant’s compound was highly related to 
that of a known compound.87 However, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
board’s decision, holding that the biological effect of the small difference 
in structure was a compound with an effect opposite of that of than the 
compound known in the art.88 The court found this difference to be a 
prime example of how to overcome prima facie obviousness.89  
Another consideration taken into account when determining if a 
claimed compound is prima facie obvious is how generic or specific the 
 
 
 84. See In re Dillon, supra note 82, at 692.  
 85. In re Papesch, 315 F.2d at 386-87. “If that which appears, at first blush, to be obvious though 
new is shown by evidence not to be obvious, then the evidence prevails over surmise or unsupported 
contention and a rejection based on obviousness must fall.” Id. 
 86. In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
Appellants’ affidavit evidence, we note, shows that the additional advantageous activity 
disclosed for the claimed compounds, namely antiviral activity, is not in fact possessed by the 
prior art analog. That a claimed novel compound possesses a certain advantageous activity 
which is not in fact possessed by a prior art compound is itself evidence of the 
nonobviousness of the subject matter as a whole . . . . [A] newly discovered activity of a 
claimed novel compound which bears no material relationship to the activity disclosed for the 
prior art analogs is further evidence, not to be ignored, of the nonobviousness of the claimed 
invention. 
Id. 
 87. In re Lambooy, 300 F.2d 950, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1962). The chemical structure of applicant’s 
compound contained two ethyl side groups where the compound known in the art, riboflavin, 
contained methyl groups. Id. at 952. An ethyl group consists of two fully saturated carbons while a 
methyl group consists of one. Id. 
 88. Id. at 955. 
 89. Id.  
There is no evidence in the record which would lead one skilled in this art to expect that the 
differences in molecular structure between riboflavin and appellant’s compound would cause 
this difference in properties. The former compound is a vitamin, the latter an antivitamin; the 
former is a metabolite, the latter an antimetabolite; the former acts to promote the well-being 
of the animal, the latter acts to its detriment. We find it difficult to conceive of a better 
example of a difference in kind than is presented in this case and we also find in view of this 
record that this difference was unexpected and unobvious.  
Id. 
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prior art is in teaching the applicant’s invention.90 In chemical patents, a 
claim may disclose a generic structure that can optionally be substituted by 
any one of a number of possible chemical groups.91 When the number of 
positions for substituents on the generic structure is large and the number 
of possible chemical groups that can be substituents is also large, the 
number of chemical compounds embraced by such a generic claim is 
enormous or infinite.92 An applicant may claim as his invention a specific 
compound that falls within the scope of another patent’s generic claim.93 If 
the written description of the patent that includes the generic claim does 
not teach that specific compound as “typical” or “preferred,” the court may 
hold that the application for the specific compound is not obvious in light 
of the art because the art has not specifically taught the applicant’s 
invention.94 
 
 
 90. See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 11, at 8-27. 
[W]here a genus or generic formula has a relatively small number of variables, that is, 
substituents, then a prima facie case of obviousness can be made out. One the other hand, 
where the genus or generic formula disclosed in the prior art has a relatively large number of 
substituents that can be made, a showing of obviousness is not so readily accomplished. 
Id. 
 91. In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Jones, 958 F.2d 347. 
 92. Baird, 16 F.3d at 382. “In the instant case, the generic diphenol formula disclosed in Knapp 
contains a large number of variables, and we estimate that it encompasses more than 100 million 
different diphenols . . . .” Id. 
 93. Id. at 382-83.  
While the Knapp formula [prior art] unquestionably encompasses bisphenol A [applicant’s 
compound] when specific variables are chosen, there is nothing in the disclosure of Knapp 
suggesting that one should select such variables. Indeed, Knapp appears to teach away from 
the selection of bisphenol A by focusing on more complex diphenols . . . . [F]ifteen typical 
diphenols are recited. None of them, or any of the other preferred phenols recited above, is or 
suggests bisphenol A. 
Id. 
 94. Id. See also Jones, 958 F.2d at 350. 
[T]hough Richter [prior art] discloses the potentially infinite genus of “substituted ammonium 
salts” of dicamba, and lists several such salts, the salt claimed here [applicant’s compound] is 
not specifically disclosed. Nor, as we have explained above, is the claimed salt sufficiently 
similar in structure to those specifically disclosed in Richter as to render it prima facie 
obvious. 
Id. 
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B. Biotechnology Practice95 
With regard to DNA sequence claims, the consideration of structural 
similarity in making a case for obviousness arose in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.96 The court rejected the defendant’s allegation 
that the plaintiff’s claimed invention was obvious.97 The defendant alleged 
that it was obvious to try to clone the human DNA sequence at issue 
because the human DNA sequence possessed a high degree of similarity to 
the monkey DNA sequence.98 The Federal Circuit held that, even if a high 
degree of sequence similarity exists, obvious-to-try does not create a case 
of obviousness if motivation is absent and there is no likelihood of success 
if tried.99 Thus, it appears that the standards for obviousness for DNA 
sequence claims may be consistent with the standards created by Dillon 
for chemical practice.100  
Next, the Federal Circuit has addressed the issue of generic claims in 
the field of biotechnology. Specifically, the court has held that, due to the 
degeneracy101 of the genetic code, disclosure of a protein sequence does 
not make the DNA sequence encoding that protein obvious.102 In In re 
Bell, the court found that the prior art disclosure of a protein sequence 
suggested over (10 x e36) different DNA sequences that could encode for 
the protein.103 The applicant claimed as his invention a few of those 
 
 
 95. See BURCHFIEL, supra note 12, at 85 (footnotes omitted). Relevant to the field of 
biotechnology, key secondary consideration factors are predicted to be: documentation of extensive 
technological competition focused on identical goals as a way to demonstrate long felt need in the art, 
“failure of others to attain the goal, skepticism of experts, [w]idespread licensing, [and] commercial 
success of the invention.” Id.  
 96. Amgen, 927 F.2d 1200.  
 97. Id. at 1209. 
 98. Id. at 1208-09. 
 99. Id. at 1208. “While this testimony indicates that it might have been feasible, perhaps obvious 
to try, to successfully probe a human gDNA library with a monkey cDNA probe, it does not indicate 
that the gene could have been identified and isolated with a reasonable likelihood of success.” Id. 
 100. See supra note 82. 
 101. See JAMES DARNELL ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY ch. 3 (2d ed. 1990) for a discussion 
of the degeneracy of the genetic code. 
 102. See In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 103. 991 F.2d at 784.  
[B]ecause of the degeneracy of the genetic code, there are a vast number of nucleotide 
sequences that might code for a specific protein . . . . In the case of IGF [protein at issue], Bell 
has argued without contradiction that the . . . amino acid sequences could be coded for by 
more than 1036 different nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are the human sequences 
that Bell now claims.  
Id. 
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sequences; those that actually encode the human protein IGF.104 The court 
held that although the prior art suggested an enormous number of DNA 
sequences that could code for the protein, including the applicant’s 
sequences, the art provided no teaching to suggest which of the vast 
number of sequences encoded the human protein.105 Thus, the applicant’s 
invention was not obvious over the prior art because the art did not teach 
or suggest that the sequences claimed by the applicant would encode the 
human protein.106 The Federal Circuit reiterated this view in In re Deuel.107 
Also, the court held that the existence of a general technique for isolating 
DNA sequences when a protein sequence is known does not render the 
DNA sequence obvious because knowledge of the protein sequence, 
coupled with the general method, still does not suggest the selection of 
specific DNA sequences.108 In the absence of such a suggestion, the prima 
facie case of obviousness is not made.109  
Although the courts have yet to address a number of issues pertaining 
to obviousness, the few teachings that do exist suggest consistency with 
the field of chemical practice.110  
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
[G]iven the nearly infinite number of possibilities suggested by the prior art, and the failure of 
the cited prior art to suggest which of those possibilities is the human sequence, the claimed 
sequences would not have been obvious . . . . [A]bsent anything in the cited prior art 
suggesting which of the possible sequences suggested by Rinderknecht [prior art] corresponds 
to the IGF gene, the PTO has not met its burden of establishing that the prior art would have 
suggested the claimed sequences. 
Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558-59. 
A prior art disclosure of the amino acid sequence of a protein does not necessarily render 
particular DNA molecules encoding the protein obvious because the redundancy of the 
genetic code permits one to hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for 
the protein. No particular one of these DNAs can be obvious unless there is something in the 
prior art to lead to the particular DNA and indicate that it should be prepared. 
Id. 
 108. Id. at 1559.  
 109. Id. “There must, however, still be prior art that suggests the claimed compound in order for a 
prima facie case of obviousness to be made out. . . . A general incentive does not make obvious a 
particular result . . . .” Id. 
 110. See supra notes 81-94. 
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IV. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION111 
A. Chemical Practice 
“To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification 
must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in 
the art can clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed 
invention.’”112 Because of the unpredictability of the properties of 
seemingly-related compounds, this standard is heightened in chemical 
cases.113 Therefore, chemical inventions require a greater degree of 
description and examples of the invention in order to ensure that the 
inventor understands and possesses all that he claims as his invention.114 
However, the Federal Circuit has also recognized that generic claims can 
be allowed in chemical practice: The description of the structure in a 
generic chemical claim may be sufficient to allow one skilled in the art to 
envision which species specifically fall within or outside of the claim.115 
 
 
 111. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 contains three requirements that must be satisfied in order to obtain a 
patent: written description, enablement, and best mode. The courts have recognized that each is a 
distinct, separate requirement. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). This Note focuses 
exclusively on the written description requirement of § 112 ¶1 and does not discuss the enablement or 
best mode requirements. For a discussion of these two requirements, see CHISUM supra note 2, ch. 3. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1 reads: Specification: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention.  
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001). 
 112. Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (quoting Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Stated 
another way, to comply with the written description requirement, an applicant must “‘describ[e] the 
invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious,’ and by using ‘such 
descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed 
invention.’” Id. (quoting Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572). 
 113. In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1973). “In other cases, particularly but not 
necessarily, chemical cases, where there is unpredictability (citation omitted) in performance of certain 
species or subcombinations other than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in the art may be 
found not to have been placed in possession of a genus . . . .” Id. 
 114. Id. at n.3. “[I]t is the predictability or the unpredictability of the elements, be they chemical 
or mechanical, which is determinative . . . .” Id. 
 115. Regents of the University of California, 119 F.3d at 1568. 
In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity 
what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from 
others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a 
formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus. 
Id. 
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The degree of disclosure required is dependent on the particular case.116 
Inherent in the written description requirement is the requirement that 
the inventor has a conception of his invention.117 However, conception of 
the structure alone cannot satisfy the written description requirement: A 
sufficient description of how to obtain or make the invention must also 
exist.118 Furthermore, conception of an invention cannot be defined in 
terms of functional utility alone.119  
Cases dealing with the written description requirement in chemical 
practice also consider whether the scope of the claimed invention is 
commensurate with the scope of description of the invention in the 
specification.120 Even if the specification enables one of skill in the art to 
practice a broader scope than what the specification teaches, the court 
interprets and limits the claims only to be as broad as what is described in 
the specification.121  
B. Biotechnology Practice 
Initially, with respect to the written description requirement, 
biotechnology practice appeared to be consistent with chemical practice.122 
The Federal Circuit in Fiers v. Revel made it clear that the rules from 
chemical practice governed determinations of whether a patent applicant 
satisfied the written description requirement for claims pertaining to 
DNA.123 Specifically, the DNA itself, not a method for isolating or using 
 
 
 116. See supra note 112. 
 117. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 
1206). “Conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or 
is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or whatever 
characteristics sufficiently distinguish it.” Id. 
 118. Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1206. “[C]onception of a chemical compound requires that the 
inventor be able to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain 
it.” Id.; Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “Conception requires (1) the idea of 
the structure of the chemical compound and (2) possession of an operative method of making it.” Id.  
 119. See infra note 123. 
 120. ROSENSTOCK, supra note 11, at 9-6. The PTO rejects patent applications for lack of written 
description when “the claim or claims have encompassed more elements, compositions, utilities, and 
the like than those recited in the specification.” Id. 
 121. In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971). “For greater clarity on this point, 
consider the case where the specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening 
language of any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B 
and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been described.” Id.; In re Ahlbrecht, 435 F.2d 
908, 911 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“In the present case, there are no negative statements that esters with two 
methylenes are not within what is regarded as the invention, but rather here esters wherein n is 2 were 
never described in explicit terms at all.”).  
 122. See supra notes 112-21. 
 123. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “We thus determined that, irrespective 
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the DNA, must be described and the inventor must make it clear that he 
has possession of the DNA that is claimed.124 The court held that the 
appellee had satisfied the written description requirement because, in 
contrast to the appellants, he actually described the DNA of the invention 
by providing the complete nucleotide sequence of the DNA.125 
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, the Federal 
Circuit held that disclosure and description of the DNA sequence from one 
vertebrate species, in combination with general methods for cloning DNA, 
was not a sufficient written description to allow a claim to all vertebrate 
DNAs that encode a particular protein of interest.126 This holding was 
consistent with Fiers.127 In addition, the court found that the claim for 
vertebrate DNAs that encode for the protein of interest merely described a 
function of the DNA, not the DNA itself.128 Finally, the court specifically 
rejected a claim to the human DNA sequence that encoded for the protein 
because the human DNA was not described in the application and there 
was no way to distinguish this DNA from any other.129 The holdings in 
 
 
of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like 
conception of any chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its 
functional utility.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 1170-71.  
An adequate written description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part 
of the invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a 
description of the DNA itself. . . . [A] bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be 
obtained by reverse transcription [a technique] is not a description; it does not indicate that 
Revel [appellant] was in possession of the DNA. 
Id. 
 125. Id. at 1172.  
“[S]ugano’s [appellee’s] application satisfies the written description requirement since it sets 
forth the complete and correct nucleotide sequence of a DNA coding for B-IF [protein of 
interest] and thus ‘conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that . . . [Sugano] 
was in possession of the [DNA coding for B-IF].’” 
Id. 
 126. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569. “The claimed genera of vertebrate and mammal cDNA are not 
described by the general language of the 525 patent’s written description supported only by the 
specific nucleotide sequence of rat insulin [protein of interest].” Id. 
 127. See supra note 124. 
 128. Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566. “An adequate written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise 
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or 
plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” Id.  
It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that result. 
Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute 
requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if 
one made that invention. 
Id. at 1568. 
 129. Id. at 1567. 
The name cDNA is not itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys no distinguishing 
information concerning its identity . . . it thus does not describe human insulin [protein of 
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Fiers and Lilly are consistent with the written description requirements of 
chemical practice.130 
Recently, in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
appears to have broken away from the rules of chemical practice.131 In 
Enzo, the court held that the written description requirement could be 
satisfied by deposit132 of the biological material at a publicly-accessible 
depository.133 Significantly, the court’s decision was directly in 
contradiction to the precedent set forth in Fiers and Lilly: As a result of the 
Enzo decision, DNA no longer needs to be described by its sequence or 
structural information or in a way that distinguishes the claimed DNA 
from other DNA that may perform the same function.134 The court claimed 
to be applying the written description requirement guidelines that the PTO 
had recently published.135 According to the guidelines, a functional 
description can be used to describe the invention, only if it is “coupled 
with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure. 
. . .”
136
 However, in Enzo, the court did not apply this standard; instead, 
the court held that a deposit alone could satisfy the written description 
requirement, even in the absence of structural data.137  
In addition, the PTO’s Manual for Patent Examination Procedure 
(“MPEP”) states that a deposit can substitute for a written description 
when words alone cannot sufficiently describe the invention.138 However, 
 
 
interest] DNA. Describing a method of preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that 
the cDNA encodes . . . does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself. 
Id. 
 130. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text. 
 131. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). For a discussion of 
the Enzo decision and its impact on the written description requirement, see Chandra Garry, Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 195 (2003); Jeffie A. Kopczynski, Note, A 
New Era For § 112? Exploring the Developments in the Written Description Requirement as Applied 
to Biotechnology Inventions, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229 (2002).  
 132. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1325. The technique of depositing biological materials originally arose as a 
way to satisfy the enablement requirement. Id. By letting the public have the material, they were 
enabled to use it. Id. 
 133. Id.  
[W]e hold that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository, which makes 
its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form, 
constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the 
written description requirement of § 112 ¶ 1. 
Id. 
 134. See notes 124 and 128. The Enzo holding contradicts established biotechnology practice. Id. 
 135. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 1, “Written 
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (January 5, 2001). 
 136. Id. at 1106. 
 137. See supra note 133. 
 138. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1325-26. The court referred to the MPEP, § 2402 (8th ed. Aug. 2001), by 
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Enzo’s invention was a DNA sequence and until this case, the Federal 
Circuit had required the sequence of the DNA to be disclosed in order to 
satisfy the written description requirement.139 The Federal Circuit set forth 
no reason for breaking from precedent and why words alone could no 
longer describe DNA.140  
Another concern is the fact that the court’s new standard does not 
require that the inventor be in possession of or have a conception of his 
invention.141 In this case, the inventor knew that the deposited bacteria 
contained DNA that could perform a desired function.142 Rather than 
describe that DNA, the inventor described the function and deposited the 
bacteria containing the DNA.143 The court required no correlation between 
function and structure; instead, a deposit replaced disclosure of the 
structure.144 Thus, it is not clear that the inventor had the DNA in his 
possession: Enzo could not describe the sequence of the DNA, could not 
describe its structure, physical or chemical properties, or any functional 
property in combination with a structural property.145 In other words, Enzo 
could not satisfy the written description requirement or possession 
 
 
stating “[a] deposit may be necessary . . . ‘where the invention involves a biological material and 
words alone cannot sufficiently describe how to make or use the invention . . . .’” Id. 
 139. See supra notes 124, 128-29. 
 140. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In a recent 
case, the court addressed the issue of the written description requirement for biotechnology inventions. 
Id. The invention at issue did not pertain to the written description requirement for a novel DNA 
sequence. Id. at 1332. Thus, the Enzo precedent did not apply. Id. The court did, however, mention the 
Enzo decision and comment positively on its holding. Id. The court stated,  
[I]n Enzo-Biochem, we clarified that Eli Lilly did not hold that all functional descriptions of 
genetic material necessarily fail as a matter of law to meet the written description 
requirement; rather, the requirement may be satisfied if in the knowledge of the art the 
disclosed function is sufficiently correlated to a particular, known structure.” The paradox of 
this court’s affirmance of the holding of Enzo is that the Enzo court required no disclosure of 
the structure of the DNA. See supra note 133. Thus, the Amgen court failed to acknowledge 
what the court actually did in Enzo. The Federal Circuit has yet to apply the Enzo precedent.  
Id. 
 141. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326 “Although the structures of those sequences, i.e., the exact nucleotide 
base pairs, are not expressly set forth in the specification, those structures may not have been 
reasonably obtainable and in any event were not known to Enzo when it filed its application . . . .”. Id. 
If the sequence was not known, how was Enzo found to be in possession of the invention, as required 
to satisfy the written description requirement? See supra note 124.  
 142. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1321. “The inventors believed that if the preferential hybridization ratio . . . 
were greater than about five to one, then the ‘discrete nucleotide sequence would hybridize to virtually 
al strains of Neisseria gonorrhoeae and to no strain of Neisseria meningitidis.’” Id. However, the 
inventors never identified the DNA sequence of those nucleotides. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See supra note 133. 
 145. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326.  
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requirement of the PTO guidelines and hence of section 112 paragraph 1, 
as established for chemical practice.146 
V. ANALYSIS 
As discussed Part II.B, the utility requirement guidelines issued by the 
PTO contradict chemical practice in several ways.147 First, the guidelines 
allow utility to be inferred based on similarity to compounds with known 
use and second, when a DNA or protein is similar to a known compound, 
the PTO will ascribe the same function to the new invention.148  
To date, the Federal Circuit has not heard a case addressing the utility 
requirement for a DNA or protein sequence. Thus, there is no guidance 
from the court on this issue. When a case does come before the Federal 
Circuit, it will be of interest to see if the court acknowledges that chemical 
practice is applicable or whether the court will try to set new precedent, in 
accord with the PTO Guidelines, for this area by distinguishing the 
chemical field.  
The Federal Circuit has not yet decided on whether a claimed invention 
of a DNA sequence will be rejected as obvious if it is highly homologous 
(similar) or nearly identical to a sequence known in the art. That is, the 
court has not decided if similar DNA sequences are prima facie obvious. 
For example, the prior art may disclose the DNA sequence for a protein 
that is a key intermediate in an intracellular signaling pathway. The art 
only discloses a role for the protein in signaling. The applicant may have 
discovered the DNA sequence for a protein that is identical to the protein 
known in the art except for one amino acid difference due to the change of 
one nucleotide in the DNA.149 Although this difference is slight and results 
in only a single amino acid change in the encoded protein, it causes the 
protein to inhibit signaling and thus behave in an opposite manner from 
the already-known protein.  
 
 
 146. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Application Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 ¶ 1, “Written 
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106. The requirements for satisfying the possession 
requirement are very similar as those for satisfying the written description requirement:  
An applicant may also show that an invention is complete by disclosure of sufficiently 
detailed, relevant identifying characteristics which provide evidence that applicant was in 
possession of the claimed invention, i.e., complete or partial structure, other physical and/or 
chemical properties, functional characteristics when coupled with a known or disclosed 
correlation between function and structure . . . .” 
Id. See also supra notes 112-21.  
 147. Compare supra notes 33-58 with 68-77. 
 148. See supra notes 71-76. 
 149. For a review of molecular biology, see ALBERTS, supra note 15.  
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Biotechnology is a subset of chemical practice, but it is not clear that 
the Federal Circuit will apply the same standards, although Amgen raises 
the hope that the same standard will apply.150 Applying the standards of 
Dillon, a prima facie case of obviousness is not made in the hypothetical 
presented in the preceding paragraph.151 Although there is a high degree of 
sequence structural similarity, the motivation to discover or try this 
invention is absent. The art only teaches a role in promoting intracellular 
signaling, not in inhibiting signaling. If the PTO erroneously rejected the 
application due to prima facie obviousness, on appeal, the result should be 
the same as in Lambooy, where the patentee overcame an obviousness 
rejection by a showing of unexpected results.152 
In addition, the Federal Circuit has declined to decide if the amino acid 
sequence of a protein is obvious if the DNA sequence is known.153 The 
standard set forth in Dillon does not apply because the DNA and protein 
sequences are not structurally similar because they are composed of 
different chemical subunits.154 Because the amino acids encoded by 
particular triplets of nucleotides are known, it seems obvious to expect 
success in determining the exact amino acid sequence encoded by a DNA 
sequence.155 The prima facie case of obviousness is made: Knowledge of 
the nucleotides can be used to deduce the exact amino acid sequence. 
However, proteins are sometimes changed by post-translational 
modification after they have been translated.156 For example, amino acids 
at one end of the protein may have to be removed before the protein can be 
functional.157 This modification is not reflected in the DNA sequence.158 
Thus, if a claim for such a protein is rejected as prima facie obvious, this 
obviousness rejection should be overcome by showing the unexpected 
 
 
 150. See supra notes 96-99. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See supra notes 87-89. 
 153. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court notes: “We also express no 
opinion concerning the reverse proposition, that knowledge of the structure of a DNA, e.g., a cDNA, 
might make a protein obvious.” Id. 
 154. See ALBERTS, supra note 15. 
 155. In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783. “A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the 
teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed subject matter to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art.” (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).  
 156. See THOMAS E. CREIGHTON, PROTEINS: STRUCTURES AND MOLECULAR PROPERTIES 78-99 
(2d ed. 1993). A protein can be translated into a form that is inactive and nonfunctional. Id. To become 
functional, the protein must be modified after translation is completed (i.e., it must be post-
translationally modified). Id. Different types of post-translational modifications can be performed. Id.  
 157. Id. at 79. 
 158. Id. at 78-99. Certain post-translational modifications can be predicted based upon knowledge 
of the sequence, while other modifications cannot be predicted from DNA sequence knowledge alone. 
Id.  
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result that the mature protein sequence cannot be discerned from 
knowledge of the DNA sequence.159  
In Enzo, the Federal Circuit declined to rule and instead remanded the 
issue of whether claims to subsequences and mutations of the claimed 
DNA sequences were valid.160 Since the inventor could not describe the 
structure or sequence of the invention and instead deposited the sequences, 
it is difficult to understand how the inventor can claim to be in possession 
of subsequences and variants or even know if such sequences will perform 
the claimed function.161 However, the court suggests that such claims will 
be allowed under the new rules set forth in the case: Since deposit satisfies 
the written description requirement of the sequences, the deposit may also 
satisfy this requirement as to subsequences because they too have 
technically been deposited.162  
Additional issues with regard to the written description requirement 
exist. For example, DNA inventions often claim any DNA sequences that 
are similar by a certain percentage to the disclosed sequence.163 However, 
it is not clear that such claims are sufficiently described. What if the 
patented prior art sequence is thirty nucleotides in length and a sequence 
that is over 1,000 nucleotides in length has the requisite amount of 
similarity in a region that is similar to the disclosed sequence of thirty 
nucleotides? Would the court consider the sequence of over 1,000 
 
 
 159. See supra notes 87-89 wherein a seemingly minor modification caused an unexpected result, 
thereby overcoming an obviousness rejection. 
 160. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326. Subsequences are parts or regions of the full length DNA of the 
invention. Id. Mutations are nucleotide differences from the original sequence. ALBERTS, supra note 
15, at 242. There is no way to predict where these changes will occur. Id. at 245. 
 161. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1326. “[T]here are at least hundreds of subsequences of the deposited 
sequences, an unknown number of which might also meet the claimed hybridization ratio [function].” 
Id. 
 162. Id. at 1326-27. “[B]ecause the deposited sequences are described by virtue of a reference to 
their having been deposited, it may well be that various subsequences, mutations, and mixtures of 
those sequences are also described to one of skill in the art.” Id. 
 163. As an example, see U.S. Patent No. 6476206B1, claims 3, 15 (issued Nov. 5, 2002). Claim 3 
reads: 3. A cDNA molecule which is at least 99% identical to the nucleotide sequence shown in SEQ 
ID NO:1, wherein percent identity is determined using a Smith-Waterman homology search algorithm 
using an affine gap search with a gap open penalty of 12 and a gap extension penalty of 1. Claim 15 
reads: 15. A cDNA molecule which is at least 99% identical across its entire length to the nucleotide 
sequence shown in SEQ ID NO:1, wherein percent identity is determined using a Smith-Waterman 
homology search algorithm using an affine gap search with a gap open penalty of 12 and a gap 
extension penalty of 1. Note that claim 15 contains the requirement that the percent-identity must 
extend along the entire length of the DNA, while claim 3 does not contain such a requirement. In claim 
15, the identity must exist along the length of the disclosed sequence (SEQ ID NO:1); however, the 
other DNA molecule may be considerably longer than the DNA shown in SEQ ID NO:1 so that the 
percent-identity could exist for only a small section of that second DNA’s length. Should the claimed, 
patented sequence embrace this second sequence? It is not clear that the inventor ever conceived of 
such a sequence. 
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nucleotides to fall within the claim and to be sufficiently described just 
because it happens to contain the thirty nucleotides of the invention? 
Would it fall within the claim even though the patentee never conceived of 
the idea of the sequence that is over 1,000 nucleotides? What if a protein 
encoded for by a DNA sequence with a high degree of similarity to a 
disclosed DNA sequence performs function opposite to the function of the 
protein encoded for by the disclosed and described sequence? Would such 
a sequence fall within the scope of the claims even though it arguably has 
not been described functionally and has not been conceived?  
Further, the court has held that the scope of the claims cannot be 
broader than what the inventor describes as his invention in the 
specification.164 This is at least true for chemical practice. However, a 
claim to sequences with similarity to a known sequence may be enabled 
and one skilled in the art could isolate that sequence based on the 
enablement. It is unclear whether such a claim is adequately disclosed in 
the patent or that the inventor ever possessed or conceived of that 
particular sequence.165  
The court in Enzo set a new standard, holding that a deposit of the 
invention satisfies the written description requirement.166 However, this 
deposit option originally arose for a different purpose: to satisfy the 
enablement requirement for complex biotechnology inventions that could 
not easily or adequately be enabled by words alone.167 Such 
acknowledgment of the complexities of biotechnological inventions seems 
reasonable for inventions such as cell lines and other inventions that are 
difficult to describe or teach how to make.168 These inventions do not fall 
within the area of chemical practice.169 However, DNA, although 
classified within the field of biotechnology, is in fact a chemical and thus 
chemical practice should apply to DNA inventions.170 In addition, the 
deposit option exists for inventions that are not adequately described or 
 
 
 164. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra notes 111, 121 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 132. 
 168. See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 11, at 9-7.  
Where an invention, which is the subject of a patent application, depends on the use of a 
microorganism or other biological material, such microorganism or other biological material, 
if it is not known and is not readily available, must be deposited and made available to the 
public upon issuance of the patent. 
Id. See also supra note 138. 
 169. See ROSENSTOCK, supra note 11, at 9-7. 
 170. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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enabled by words alone.171 DNA is easily described by its sequence: The 
knowledge and ability to sequence DNA has existed since the 1970s.172 In 
Fiers, the court required that the DNA at issue be described by its 
sequence before the written description requirement was satisfied.173 The 
dates of invention in that case were 1979 and 1980.174 It is not clear why 
the court did not require Enzo to sequence the DNA of the invention, 
because DNA sequencing methodology had been well established.175 
Finally, it is yet to be determined what effect the Enzo decision will 
have on the patenting of biotechnology inventions.176 Will this holding 
change biotechnology practice? Will inventors now routinely deposit their 
materials, including sequences, deciding to forgo writing an adequate 
description of their invention with its chemical or structural properties?  
VI. PROPOSAL 
As the Federal Circuit stated in Amgen, “DNA is a chemical 
compound, albeit a complex one.”177 I propose that courts follow the 
precedent set in the field of chemical practice since DNA is a chemical 
compound and until recently, the Federal Circuit had acknowledged this 
fact.178 If the court follows chemical practice precedent, some patent 
holders risk invalidation if their patents were allowed under the PTO 
guidelines that contradict chemical practice.179 However, this result is 
more favorable than the alternative, which is the creation of a new body of 
law for a subset of an established area of patent law. This alternative 
would create unpredictability in the fields of both chemistry and 
biotechnology: The classification of DNA as a chemical or biotechnology 
invention would become dispositive of the question of a patent’s 
validity.180  
 
 
 171. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. 
 172. See DARNELL, supra note 101, at 213-14. 
 173. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 174. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1167-68. 
 175. See supra note 172. The sequences were 850 or 1300 nucleotides in length. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 
1326. 
 176. Compare notes 124 and 128 with note 133. 
 177. See supra note 19. 
 178. Compare notes 124 and 128 with note 133. 
 179. Compare notes 33-58 with notes 68-77. 
 180. If classified as a biotechnology invention, a statement that the sequence resembles a known 
sequence would satisfy the utility requirement and disclosure of only a functional property or deposit 
of the material would satisfy the written description requirement. If classified as a chemical invention, 
a higher level of scrutiny would apply. This standard would require proof of actual utility of the 
claimed invention to satisfy the utility requirement and disclosure of a chemical or structural property 
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The Federal Circuit has yet to hear a case that specifically deals with 
the utility requirement. The PTO recently set forth guidelines on how to 
satisfy this requirement.181 However, as discussed above, several of the 
provisions contradict established chemical practice.182 The risk currently 
exists that the court, although not bound by the PTO guidelines, will apply 
the guidelines exclusively and ignore the precedent set forth in Brenner.183 
Also, the risk exists that the PTO has been issuing patents for DNA 
sequences that fail the patentability requirements set forth in Brenner yet 
satisfy the requirements in the guidelines. If such cases reach the Federal 
Circuit, since DNA is a chemical,184 the court should follow chemical 
practice and apply the precedent from Brenner.185 The court should not 
create a new field of practice for the biotechnology subset of chemical 
practice, even at the risk of invalidation of patents the PTO has allowed.186  
Next, the standards applied for obviousness appear to be consistent 
between chemical and biotechnology practice.187 However, the Federal 
Circuit has heard only a limited number of cases188 and, as discussed 
above, the court has yet to decide numerous issues. When these issues 
come before the court, the court should look to chemical practice to 
maintain consistency and predictability with an established area of patent 
law. Specifically, the court should first look to determine the degree of 
similarity between the prior art and the proposed invention and determine 
whether or not the art provides motivation to try the proposed invention.189  
Finally, while it appeared that the written description requirements 
between chemical and biotechnology practices were consistent, the recent 
Enzo decision has changed that appearance dramatically.190 The Enzo 
decision directly contradicts the standard and teaching from Fiers: that 
regardless of how complex or simple the DNA may be, its structure, not 
function, must be described.191 Also, the court in Enzo implied that a 
description of the invention’s function alone may satisfy the written 
 
 
to satisfy the written description requirement. See supra notes 33-58, 78-77, 113-21, 131-46. 
 181. See supra note 68. 
 182. See supra notes 71, 74 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 33-58 and 68-77 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text. 
 190. Compare notes 112-29 with notes 131-33. 
 191. See supra note 124. 
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description requirement.192 This specifically contradicts Fiers and Lilly.193 
Hence, the Enzo dictum cannot be broadly applied or followed in future 
cases.  
If the Enzo decision becomes precedent, the Federal Circuit should 
narrow the rule from Enzo and only allow a deposit to satisfy the written 
description requirement for biotechnology inventions that are not in fact 
chemical compounds. In other words, the court should not allow a deposit 
to satisfy the written description requirement for a DNA sequence.194  
CONCLUSION 
The current patent standards that exist in the fields of chemical and 
biotechnology practice are inconsistent. The standards for the utility 
requirement vary between the two fields.195 Specifically, the PTO recently 
set forth new utility guidelines that appear to lower the utility requirement 
for biotechnological patent applications, while a heightened standard 
applies to chemical claims.196 The Federal Circuit has yet to hear a case 
resolving this issue.  
The standards for review of obviousness appear to be consistent 
between chemical and biotechnology practices.197 However, the Federal 
Circuit has yet to hear a number of specific issues relating to obviousness 
with regard to DNA sequences. When these issues do come to the Federal 
Circuit, the court must continue to follow chemical practice precedent. 
Finally, the Federal Circuit recently changed the written description 
requirements for biotechnology practice.198 The break from established 
practice is unsupported and is inconsistent with the new PTO guidelines 
for written description.199 This decision will likely impact and alter how 
companies pursue their patent strategies and file patent applications.200  
Today’s pharmaceutical companies spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars in the development of new drugs and therapies.201 The companies 
 
 
 192. Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1330. “It is not correct, however, that all functional descriptions of genetic 
material fail to meet the written description requirement.”Id. 
 193. See supra notes 124, 128. 
 194. See supra note 138. The MPEP instructions specifically state that a deposit satisfies the 
written description requirement only when words alone cannot. Id. 
 195. Compare notes 33-58 with 66-77. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See supra notes 81-109. 
 198. See supra notes 131-37, 139-45. 
 199. See supra notes 113-21, 138. 
 200. See supra note 180. 
 201. See supra note 6. 
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need to ensure that their rights will be protected, otherwise, the incentives 
to invest in research are lost. The court must carefully consider how to 
proceed in the rapidly growing area of biotechnology, which is a subset of 
chemical practice, and set clear, predictable precedents that are consistent 
with chemical practice.  
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